Transportation networks and governments are both hierarchically organized. In some states state government finances most of the highways, while in other states similar roads are financed locally. Larger governments attain scale economies. However they also tend to be more bureaucratic and have higher operating costs, all else equal, due to problems such as span of control. This study relates highway expenditures with share of expenditure by state government to determine how governments should share expenditure on all roads in a state. Highways are divided into two hierarchical classes: Higher and Lower, and a third case that consists both higher and lower hierarchical classes is also considered. For each state, in each highway class three different costs are considered: capital outlay, operations and maintenance, and total costs. Two government layers are considered: state (including federal contributions) and local government. A series of regression models to predict different highway expenditures, in each highway hierarchical class, as a function of utilization, capacity and funding shares are estimated. We find that there is a share of expenditures by each level of government in each highway hierarchical class, which results in a minimum expenditure for each funding category (capital, operating). That minimum is not very far from typical state/local mixes found in many states. The results of this study can be applied in formulation of efficient network financing arrangements. Policies can be formulated that can help adjust the financial responsibilities of transportation networks between government layers.
INTRODUCTION
Highways and government are both hierarchically organized.
Providing highway infrastructure requires finance of construction and maintenance. Determining what level of government should be responsible for provision, operation and regulation of each highway class is an important issue. States are continually considering turning back some roads to localities while assuming responsibility for other local roads. Management of a highway class by a geographically too small or too large jurisdiction brings about extra costs that can be avoided by appropriately assigning government layers to a roadway class. After assigning political layers to each highway class, there arises another issue of what percentage of costs each government layer should bear. The main objective of this study is to find an optimal share of costs funded by each government layer in each highway class to attain an efficient highway financing structure, i.e., minimum highway costs.
Highway costs in the form of capital outlay, to improve the existing highway network, and maintenance, to keep the existing highways in usable condition, are considered in this study. Highways are divided into two hierarchical classes: The higher class consists of Interstate highways and Arterials, the lower class consists of Collectors and Local roads. Two layers of government considered in this paper are state (including federal contributions) and local. The expenditure on highways depends on the network and its use. The share of expenditure by a government layer is considered as a variable in the model. This allows us to obtain an optimal combination that minimizes highway expenditures.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 posits the underlying theory of hierarchies in government and highways and their association, section 3 describes the data, section 4 explains the model adopted in this study, section 5 gives the results obtained and section 6 provides recommendations and conclusions.
THEORY
Both highways and government are hierarchically arranged. Highways are classified into hierarchies depending on the amount of through movement and land access they provide (1) . The shape and slope of the hierarchical pyramid of highways depends on the length or number of highways in a state falling in each class. Government is classified into hierarchical layers depending on the extent of geographical area its jurisdiction governs.
Each class of highway is controlled or financed by a set of government layers. A new dimension can be added to this problem if we consider different costs, shared by a set of government layers. With this cost dimension the hierarchical pyramid of highways is represented in Figure 1 . Each block in Figure 1 can be considered as dollars invested (or expenditure share) by a government layer in a highway class for a particular purpose like maintenance or capital outlay. If a government layer is not funding certain cost categories of a highway class then that block in Figure 1 is as filled with zero dollars.
Government layers associated with a highway class can share costs in different proportions to reach a minimum. In this case the variation of cost with respect to share of expenditure follows a parabolic form as shown in Figure 2 .
If significant economies of scale exist, the optimal expenditure is nearer to 100% state, but if there are large diseconomies, for instance management costs and span of control issues, the optimal share moves to the left in Figure 2 .
Three types of costs are considered in this study: capital outlay, maintenance and total costs. Capital outlays are associated with highway improvements, including: land acquisition and other right-of-way costs; preliminary and construction engineering; construction and reconstruction; resurfacing, rehabilitation, and restoration costs of roadway and structure; and installation of traffic service facilities such as guard rails, fencing, signs, and signals (2). Maintenance costs are required to keep highways in usable condition (2). These costs are investments in existing highways. Total cost is the sum of capital outlay and maintenance costs. Total expenditure here does not include administration and miscellaneous, highway law enforcement and safety, interest, and bond retirement costs. These other costs, with capital outlay and maintenance costs, make the total disbursements in a state per year. Total expenditure is not same as total disbursements.
Two types of roadway classes are considered in this study. The higher class consists of interstates, principal arterials and minor arterials. The lower class consists of major collectors, minor collectors and local roads. An all roads case is also considered in modeling. In the Federal Highway Administration -Highway Statistics series 12 roadway classes are defined. These 12 roadway classes are grouped into higher and lower classes in this model.
Only two types of government levels are considered in this study: state government and local government. Federal dollars are channeled through states and so are combined with state dollars here.
Expenditure on a highway depends on that road's output, network extent, and prices of inputs. Since determining optimal expenditure shares by associated government layers is the objective of this study, expenditure share is an important variable in the model, and is introduced in quadratic form. Different output variables on which highway expenditure depends are vehicle miles traveled by passenger cars, trucks and other vehicles. A few network variables are length of highways, average width of highways, average number of lanes, average thickness of the pavement and so on.
Previous studies (3) which included prices of capital, labor and construction materials as independent variables found that while prices of construction materials were not significant, interest rates and labor costs were significant factors in long run, but they are insignificant in short run. However it has not been possible to successfully estimate a model with prices, output and network extent simultaneously.
The existing expenditure structure in US:
The highways in the 50 United States and District of Columbia are financed differently and there is no reason to expect them to have similar expenditure shares by state and local governments. In some states like Minnesota, New Jersey and Colorado the local government assumes most of the expenditure on capital outlay and maintenance, while state government share is less than 40% of the total expenditure. Whereas in other states like Kentucky, West Virginia and New Mexico state government is financing most of the expenditure on capital outlay and maintenance, and local government is financing less than 20% of the total expenditure. States are arranged in ascending order of their total expenditure share in Table  1 .
DATA
The data required for the analysis is collected from the FHWA website and U.S Department of transportation for the year 1996 (2).
Cost variables:
The required cost variables are capital outlay and maintenance costs of higher and lower road classes by state and local government. Investment of state government on higher and lower roadway classes is given in tables. The flow of money from state and local governments to capital outlay and maintenance costs of higher and lower highway classes and between the state and local governments is shown in Figure 3 . Local government is assumed to be investing on lower class roads only. But local government payments to state government is in turn invested on roads. Therefore local government is indirectly investing on higher class roads. Similarly State government aid to local government, which is actually listed as local government expenditure, is counted as investment by state government and is distributed to lower roads. Units for the costs are thousands of dollars.
Network Variable:
Length is the network variable used in the study and is measured in thousands of miles. Width of the network in terms of lanes was tried, but we were unable to acquire accurate lane miles estimates for all road classes.
Output Variables:
Two output variables are used, they are annual vehicle miles traveled by passenger cars and trucks in the units of million vehicle miles traveled on each class of road. But percentage of vehicle miles traveled by a vehicle type in a roadway class is not available for all 12 listed roadway classes therefore it need to be estimated for those roadway classes for which it is unavailable. The model used for estimation is explained in the following sub-section.
Instrumental variables:
For any given state, the percentage of annual vehicle miles traveled by a vehicle type in a roadway class is available only for the top 7 roadway classes. Therefore the percentage of vehicle miles traveled by a vehicle type for lower roadway classes need to be predicted. In formulating such a model, two problems are encountered. They are explained below.
1)
A model specific to a particular roadway class and generalized for all states cannot tell us the percentage of vehicle miles traveled by a vehicle type on another roadway class. Therefore a variable specific to hierarchies is needed. Since such a variable is not readily available, an integer rank is given to each roadway class starting with 1 for urban interstate and ending with 12 for rural local roads at the bottom of the hierarchy of roads. This is used as a variable in the model. Zipf (1931) related a variable or occurrence of an event and rank of that variable or event, this relationship is known as Zipf's law (4). We extend that observation to relate the percentage of vehicle miles traveled by a vehicle type on a roadway class and the rank of that roadway class in the highway hierarchy.
2)
If a model specific to a state and generalized for any roadway class is constructed to predict percentage of vehicle miles traveled by a vehicle type in any roadway class, the number of such models is equal to number of states, which is quite cumbersome. Therefore the model should use data from all states, so that a general trend in the percentage vehicle of miles traveled by a vehicle type in the whole country can be captured.
Because of the above two problems a model that is generalized for both roadway classes and states is required. The model adopted is shown below.
Where,p ij is the estimated percentage of vehicle miles traveled by the passenger cars in the ith state on the jth roadway class, t ij is the estimated percentage of vehicle miles traveled by the trucks in ith state and jth roadway class, R j represents the rank of the jth roadway class, v ij represents the percentage of total vehicle miles traveled in jth roadway class, in ith state, l ij represents the percentage of road length of jth roadway class in ith state, α's, β's, γ's, δ's are coefficients from the regression with subscript 'p' representing the coefficients are for the model to passenger cars and subscript 't' represents the coefficients for the trucks model. Since there are three vehicle types (passenger cars, trucks, and others like transit, motor cycles, and school buses) considered in the study, determining the percentage of annual vehicle miles traveled by the passenger cars does not give percentage of annual vehicle miles traveled by the trucks. The regression results of these models are shown in Table 2 .
After predicting percentage annual VMT by vehicle type for all roadway classes and for all states, these values are used in calculating the annual VMT by a vehicle type in a state.
Where, p ai represents millions of VMT by passenger cars in ith state on all roads, t ai represents millions of VMT by trucks in ith state on all roads, V j is total vehicle miles traveled by all vehicle types on the jth class of roads. Similarly VMT by passenger cars and trucks on higher and lower highway classes can be calculated by summing only those roadway classes that belong to higher or lower class as shown below.
Where, p hi represents millions of VMT by passenger cars in ith state and on higher highway class, p li represents millions of VMT by passenger cars in ith state and on lower highway class, t hi represents millions of VMT by trucks in ith state and on higher highway class, t li represents millions of VMT by trucks in ith state and on lower highway class, {h} is set of roadway classes that belong to higher highway class, {l} is set of roadway classes that belong to lower highway class.
For convenience subscript i in p ai , t ai , p hi , p li , t hi , t li is dropped.
Summary Statistics:
The mean, standard deviation, minimum value and maximum value of the variables used in this paper are shown in Table 3 . 
MODEL
Where, r is a set of variables that represents the highway class, h is a subscript that represents higher highway class, l is a subscript that represents lower highway class, a is a subscript that represents all roads, x is a set of variables that represents the government layer, s is a subscript that represents state government layer, l is a subscript that represents local government layer, e r,x is total cost of capital outlay and maintenance on a highway class r spent by x governmental layer, c r,x is capital outlay cost on a highway class r spent by government layer x, m r,x is maintenance cost on a highway class r spent by government layer x, e r is total capital cost and maintenance spent by both state and local government on a highway class r, c r is total capital outlay spent by both state and local governments on highway class r, m r is total maintenance cost spent by both state and local governments on highway class r.
Variables in equation (5) are shown in Table 4 In equation (5) 27 equations are given. But these 27 equations are not linearly independent, implying each equation can be expressed as linear combination of other equations. After accounting all these relations among the equations the degrees of freedom of the problem comes to eight. Therefore out of 27 cost variables if we know any eight of them, the remaining cost variables can be derived. Expenditure share of a government layer is calculated as shown below: q e ,r,s = e r,s e r ; r ∈ {h, l, a} q e ,r,l = e r,l e r ; r ∈ {h, l, a} since e r = e r,s + e r,l ; r ∈ {h, l, a} q e ,r,s + q e, r,l = 1
Where, q e,r,s is expenditure share of total cost by state government on highway class r, q e,r,l is expenditure share of total cost by local government on highway class r.
Similarly expenditure share can be defined for capital outlay and maintenance costs on a highway class r. They are shown below, 
Where, q c,r,s is expenditure share of capital outlay by state government invested on a highway class r, q c,r,l is expenditure share of capital outlay by local government invested on a highway class r, q m,r,s is expenditure share of maintenance costs by state government invested on highway class r, q m,r,l is expenditure share of maintenance costs by local government invested on a highway class r.
Since the share values introduced in equations 6 -8 depend on cost variables the degrees of freedom of the problem remains 8. Therefore if we know either eight independent cost values or four independent total cost variables (any four independent variables from Table 4 ) and corresponding four expenditure share values we can solve the whole system of equations.
Since the objective of the study is to find an optimal expenditure share, costs are expressed as function of expenditure shares as shown below: Where, l r is length of highways in a state on highway class r in thousands of miles, p r is millions of vehicle miles traveled by passenger cars in a state on highway class r, t r is millions of vehicle miles traveled by trucks in a state on highway class r.
Since degree of freedom of the problem is eight, five equations in (9) are redundant. Therefore only four equations in (9) are considered in the model.
A series of regression models are tried to fit an appropriate model for capital outlay and total costs for higher highway class and all roads. The model with best fit is a quasiCobb Douglas function as shown below:
ln(e r ) = a r, 1 The adoption of a quasi-Cobb-Douglas model is not complete serendipity. The reason for considering (p/l) as a variable is to reduce the multicollinearity between VMT by passenger cars and length of roads in a state. Similarly the (t/p+t) variable is considered to reduce the multicollinearity problems between VMT by passenger cars and trucks. A model without these multicollinearity corrections gives coefficients with unacceptable signs. Outliers are tackled by taking natural logarithm to those variables, which has a frequency distribution with considerable points in its tail.
Expenditure share and its square are considered in the model so that the model is capable of investigating an optimal expenditure share. By optimal expenditure share we mean expenditure share at which the cost is minimum. If the optimal expenditure share is greater than one that means cost is minimum when it is completely funded by state government. If the optimal value is negative then cost is minimum when it is completely funded by local government. If the optimal is between zero and one that means the cost should be shared between state and local governments accordingly. A cost function is convex with respect to expenditure share (i.e., minimizing the cost function) if and only if the coefficients of expenditure shares are as shown below: a r, 2 > 0;(for total expenditure on highway class r); b r,2 > 0; (for capital outlay on highway class r); where r ∈ {h, a} (11)
RESULTS
Results show that both total expenditure and capital outlay in higher and lower highway classes are convex functions with respect to expenditure shares. Therefore expenditures attain a minimum value at a particular expenditure share which can be calculated using the coefficients of expenditure share variables as shown below: 
Where, q e ,r,s * represents the optimal expenditure share of the state government for total costs, q c ,r,s * represents the optimal expenditure share of state government for capital outlay.
The regression results for total costs and capital outlay for the all roads case are shown in Table 5 and for the higher highway class are shown in Table 6 .
Using (12) ; here r ∈ {h, a} (13)
The calculated maintenance cost is optimal but the maintenance share by state government calculated using (13) might not be optimal.
The quantities q e ,r,s * , q c ,r,s * depend only on regression coefficients, and therefore are the same for every state. But q m ,r,s * depends on e r,min , c r,min which are specific to each state, therefore q m ,r,s * is computed for each state separately, from which the average value of q m ,r,s * is calculated.
So far optimal expenditure and optimal expenditure shares are calculated only for higher highway class and all roads case. Using the results obtained from these calculations optimal expenditure and optimal expenditure share for state government for the lower highway class can be calculated using the equations shown below. 
Where, c l,min represents the optimal capital outlay on lower highway class, q c ,l,s * represents the optimal capital outlay expenditure share by state government on lower highway class.
The equations shown in (14) are for capital outlay they can be similarly extended for total and maintenance costs.
The optimal state government expenditure share values obtained are compared with their mean values in Table 7 .
The results show that state government, in order to minimize costs, should increase its investment on of lower class roads. Economies of scale can be utilized to reduce the costs on lower class roads. States have certain advantages in funding roads like centralized administration and centralized purchasing of equipment and raw materials. But state government cannot alone attend to the needs of investment demands of roads that are in vast number. The trade-off between economies of scale achieved by the state government and local knowledge available to local governments results in an optimal value of state government and local government funding
Marginal costs and Elasticities:
Using the total expenditure and capital outlay functions (10), we can calculate marginal cost functions for each type of vehicle (passenger cars and trucks) on each highway class. Using these functions, marginal cost is calculated for each state and an average marginal cost is calculated The marginal cost functions are as shown below: ; r ∈ {h, a} (
Cost elasticities for total expenditure and capital outlay for annual VMT by passenger cars and trucks can be obtained using equation (15) ; r ∈ {h, a} (
The marginal costs and elasticities of maintenance costs for higher highway class and all roads can be calculated using the values from (15) using the equations shown below. ; r ∈ {h, a} (
The elasticities of total expenditure, maintenance costs and capital outlay for passenger cars and trucks on higher highway class and all roads are shown in Table 9 .
We find that highway costs are inelastic with respect to passenger cars and trucks on both higher highway class and all roads. That means one percentage increase in VMT by passenger cars or trucks will cause less than a percent increase in highway costs. Since economy of scale is reciprocal of elasticity, passenger cars and trucks have increasing economies of scale.
Note that economies of scale for trucks obtained in this study is similar to the economies of scale obtained by Levinson and Gillen (1998) (3), while economies of scale for passenger cars is different from their results. This is due to different variables considered in these studies. Levinson and Gillen adopted price of labor and bond interest as variables, while length of roads is not considered in their model.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper develops a model that explains total expenditure and capital outlay with respect to expenditure share on higher highway class and all roads. These parabolic models attain a minimum expenditure share. These highway cost functions can be used in formulating financing policies that minimize highway costs. The study shows that a shift in highway financial responsibilities between different government layers can reduce highway costs.
Different financial policies that guide the expenditure share between government layers can be formulated in order to attain an efficient highway financing structure. This study is capable of guiding the states in their expenditure pattern over all roads As this study makes no distinction based on quality of service, additional research can shed light on the affect of highway investment pattern between state and local government on the quality of roads. 
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